TOWARD A FINAL SETTLEMENT IN JERUSALEM: REDEFINITION RATHER THAN
PARTITION:
By Shaul Arieli
See also on ‘Jerusalem in Jewish Liturgy’:
http://www.moshereiss.org/articles/01_jerusalem.htm
What to do about the Haram al Sharif, 35 acres, on which sit
two mosques holy to Islam. Below
are the remains of the first and second Jewish
temples. Talk about overlapping sacred space, that's what
this is. Here we are trying to convince the Israelis and
Palestinians, who both assert sovereignty, that we'll take
sovereignty from them and we'll reposit it with God. That's a
logical fix--they're holy sites, after all. Or, when
they rejected that idea, "We'll give you Palestinians
sovereignty above ground, and you Israelis sovereignty below." They
rejected that as well. Jerusalem, history teaches us, is not to
be shared, it's to be possessed. In the name of God, and the tribe.
Israeli politicians continually refer to Jerusalem as unified forever.
Jerusalem has two part, western and eastern. Western Jerusalem has an
overwhelming Jewish population and Eastern Jerusalem primarily an Arab
population. Eastern Jerusalem was captured by the Israelis in the 1967
war. Eastern Jerusalem with more than half of the cities residents has
77 square kilometers versus 45 for western Jerusalem. There are 230,000
Arabs, one third of every resident.
Eastern Jerusalem Arabs have Israeli ID cards, can vote in municipal
elections (although they have primarily boycotted the elections) but
are not Israeli citizens. There was been almost no terrorism from the
eastern Jerusalem Arabs.
The security wall is being built to divide the city with a maximum of
territory and a minimum of Arabs in what will be called Western
Jerusalem. Ten of thousands of Arabs on the wrong side of the wall who
carry Israeli ID cards will be cut off from jobs, schools and
hospitals. Eastern Jerusalem Arabs have Israeli ID cards, can vote in
municipal elections (although they have primarily boycotted the
elections) but are not Israeli citizens. There was been almost no
terrorism from the eastern Jerusalem Arabs. Thus it is clear the
objective is to ethically cleanse western Jerusalem.
The ninety-nine papers and proposals formulated during the twentieth
century regarding the future of Jerusalem1 testify to the importance of
the city for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – and to the ongoing
battle of interests being waged between the diplomatic and political
representatives of these three religions. Each of the proposals
considers the local and global balance of power in the boundaries of
the city and attempts to ensure freedom of worship and internal
management of the holy places.
The major issue of contention regarding political control of Jerusalem
was and is the Temple Mount. It seems that for the extremists of all
three religions any arrangement is regarded as a temporary one, until
the conditions ripen for a realization of the spiritual ideal. Over the
last decades the religious tensions already evident in the city were
intensified by the nationalist tensions of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, which were aggravated by the sides themselves and even by
additional groups in the Muslim and Christian world.2
In addition to claims to the holy sites, a large part of the Israeli
public regards a unified Jerusalem in its present borders as a single
entity and opposes its partition.3 This position was formalized in the
mythical status awarded to these boundaries as a result of the
legislation, "Jerusalem: The Capital of Israel, 1980." Against this
Israeli attachment to the idea of a unified Jerusalem lie Palestinian
religious and nationalist claims to the city. Are the State of Israel
and the Jewish nation thus inevitably called on to partition Jerusalem
and yield its holy places in order to overcome one of the substantive
obstacles to an end to the conflict with the Palestinians, or might
perhaps a solution to the question of Jerusalem's boundaries lie in
their redefinition.
Indeed, the regional conditions created as a result of the diplomatic
process between Israel and the Arab world may permit the establishment
of a diplomatic solution in Jerusalem between the Palestinians and the
State of Israel, based on the status quo in the holy places. In
envisioning a practical solution for both sides, this essay will define
the boundaries of Jerusalem through two stages. The first stage offers
a model for temporary management of a unified Jerusalem, which
considers Israel's security needs, the fabric of Palestinian life in
East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the need for the sides to resume
negotiations. This represents an interim solution until a permanent
agreement on Jerusalem is achieved. In a final settlement, because of
the overlap between the religious significance and the administrative
control in most of the sites, a territorial solution must based as far
as possible on adapting the diplomatic status to the religious status
of the holy places. To this end, the essay proposes a different kind of
organization of the sites. Finally, the remaining area of the city
should be defined in accordance with the criteria formulated during
previous negotiations and summarized in the Clinton proposal of
December 2000.
A UNIFIED CITY?
Jerusalem, crowned the capital of the kingdom of Israel after its conquest by King David circa 1000 BCE, remained under Jewish political sovereignty for nearly 500 years and religious control for slightly more than 1000 years. Its initial area was approximately eight and a half to ten acres. By the end of the Second Temple period, in the year 70 CE, Jerusalem reached new heights in development, expanding to about 550 acres; municipal boundaries of this magnitude resumed only in the mid-nineteenth century.
Since the era of King David and throughout the millennia, Jerusalem has
served as a symbol of Jewish identity and Jewish heritage. Once
Christianity was declared the official religion of the Roman empire,
the city as a whole and specific churches in particular acquired
religious significance for the Christians. The Muslims sanctified
Jerusalem shortly after their conquest of the city in the seventh
century. Although they never declared it a capital city of any kind,
they enjoyed religious and political control over it for almost 1400
years. The areas of religious and historical significance for Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam are spread out over less than 500 acres, and
comprise only 1.5 percent of unified Jerusalem's 32,000 acres.
The 1948 War of Independence left Jerusalem's Old City without Jewish
residents and under Jordanian rule for nineteen years,4 until Israel
conquered East Jerusalem and the entire West Bank and redrew the
boundaries of the city. Regarding the holy sites in Jerusalem, the
Israeli military government decided to maintain the status quo.5 The
Christians were given de facto sovereignty over the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre and parts of the Christian Quarter of the Old City. Most of
the Temple Mount was left in Muslim hands, and Jews were granted free
access to the Western Wall and to the walls of the Temple Mount. Jews
were permitted to visit the Temple Mount but not to pray there. In
addition, no flags bearing symbols of sovereignty were raised in the
precincts of the Temple Mount. As to the legal status of united
Jerusalem,6 the majority of the international community has accepted
Israeli control of the western part of the city but not the eastern
part.7 Although Israeli authorities regard the eastern portion of
Jerusalem as part of the State of Israel,8 the international community
has rejected this approach.9
The extension of Jerusalem's jurisdiction in 1967 was not undertaken
according to protocol, with the minister of the interior setting up a
commission of inquiry and holding an ordered discussion on the matter,
but by an amendment to the "order for arrangements of rule and law" of
September 1948, whose wording (clause 11b), permitted completion of the
"unification" seventeen days after the end of the war. The order,
published the following day by the government secretariat, specified a
municipal line that did not appear on a map but referred to imaginary
lines between points of reference. In no place in the judicial
proceedings does the name of Jerusalem appear, and the government's
desire to hide and blur the annexation, out of fear of a grave
international response, is evident.
In essence, there were five major principles that determined the new
boundaries of the city.10 The first and most important principle was
demographic-territorial: annexing extensive areas to Jerusalem in order
to ensure its expansion and development, while avoiding inclusion of
densely populated refugee camps and Arab villages within the precincts
of the city. In practice, the total area annexed to Jerusalem came to
17,500 acres, of which only about 1500 acres were Jordanian Jerusalem.
The rest of the area belonged to twenty-eight villages, a small number
of which were annexed in full and the rest in part. The number of
Palestinians who overnight became residents of Jerusalem and the
holders of Israeli identity cards was 69,000, representing 23 percent
of the population of the unified city. The annexation, intended to
allow for the construction of Jewish neighborhoods that would thwart
any attempt to repartition the city,11 resulted in the expropriation of
5,250 acres of the area annexed, but the remaining area was rapidly
filled with a Palestinian population. The number of Palestinian
residents is currently 231,000, representing 33 percent of the unified
city population. The number of Jews living in the ten Jewish
neighborhoods of the post-1967 addition is 179,000, representing 40
percent of the Jewish population in the entire city.
The second principle was to separate Jerusalem economically from its
West Bank environs. In practice, however, East Jerusalem has remained
the urban and economic heart of the West Bank. The largest population
in the West Bank, about 800,000 Palestinians, is concentrated in East
Jerusalem and its suburbs, and significant economic activity is also
present in the area.
The third principle was strategic/security oriented. Since those
dealing with the subject were convinced that the boundaries they drew
would be the borders of the state in the near future, they included a
significant portion of the hilltops surrounding Jerusalem. In practice,
over the years Israel built new neighborhoods on these hilltops – Ramot
Alon and Ramat Shlomo in the north and Gilo in the south – so that
today Mount Gilo in the south, Nebi Samuel in the north, and the outer
heights of Ma'ale Adumim in the east, outside the boundaries of the
annexation, are those commanding the city that has expanded.12 In the
Camp David negotiations, the Palestinians accepted the demilitarization
of their future state and its independence of a foreign army and heavy
weaponry. As such, Israel's security needs are reduced to defense
against terrorism, which does not obligate the annexation of the
Palestinian areas to the city, and certainly not the areas outside the
city protected by the security barrier. In fact, the very removal of
densely populated Palestinian regions from the boundaries of the city
will only alleviate the security solution required for daily life in
Jerusalem.
The fourth principle was to include within the city boundaries
important facilities such as the Atarot airport, the slaughterhouse in
Shuafat, and the cemetery in the Mount of Olives. In practice, the
airport is currently not being used nor is it needed, the
slaughterhouse has ceased operation, and few burials take place on the
Mount of Olives, although the site retains religious and historical
significance.
The fifth principle was to consider ownership of land and previous land
arrangements. In practice, areas that lay within the boundaries of the
municipalities of Bethlehem, Beit Jalah, and El Bireh were annexed as
part of the 5,250 acres of Palestinian land and expropriated for the
construction of Jewish neighborhoods. Although according to the 1950
Israeli law on abandoned assets the government could have expropriated
the land and private property of the Palestinians, it avoided this
measure. However, to advance construction of the separation fence, on
April 8, 2004, the Israeli government authorized the expropriation from
their legal owners of private property valued at millions of dollars,
without right of appeal.13 In negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians in the Taba talks of January 2001, which were based on the
Clinton proposal of December 2000, understandings were reached that the
Jewish neighborhoods would remain under Israeli sovereignty in a final
settlement.
Herein lay the five principles that governed the idea of the expansion
of the city. Despite thirty-eight years of "unification," however, Arab
East Jerusalem is de facto separate from the western part of the city
and from the Jewish neighborhoods in the east.14 Infrastructure
standards are entirely different: 50 percent of East Jerusalem is
without water mains and drainage systems, and 50 percent of East
Jerusalem lands have no detailed and approved zoning plans, which makes
the planning of roads and infrastructures and the provision of
construction permits in accordance with zoning plans difficult at best.
Despite the virtually unrestricted access by Arab labor to the Jewish
employment market in Jerusalem, the reality is two sectoral employment
markets in the two parts of the city.15 The same applies to the
transportation and education systems.
Only 6,000 people, a small percentage of Jerusalem's Arab population,
exercised the option of acquiring Israeli citizenship in addition to
their status as Israeli residents. The Palestinians pay taxes and enjoy
the services and benefits given to all Israeli residents, but in
actuality they only apply to the state authorities when they have no
alternative. They boycott the municipal elections, and those who have
another address outside Jerusalem voted in the elections for the
chairman of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative
Council held in January 1996, and in the elections for the chairman in
January 2005.
This reality and the progress in the negotiations at the Camp David
summit in July 2000 dictated Clinton's proposal for a final settlement.
Clinton's approach departed from the traditional American position that
regarded new municipal administrations and new Jewish Jerusalem
neighborhoods as temporary measures that would not affect the current
or future status of the city in negotiations for a permanent
settlement.16 Clinton proposed partitioning the city according to the
principle that Arab areas are Palestinian and the Jewish ones are
Israeli. This principle would similarly apply to the Old City. The
Israeli and Palestinian delegations accepted this proposal and advanced
towards a solution in the Taba talks,17 and the unofficial Geneva
accord, concluded in October 2003, draws a border that incorporates the
specific proposal of the president.18
The collapse of the political process following the Camp David summit
led to a norm of violence in which both sides felt betrayed and without
a "partner" for negotiating an acceptable solution. Moreover, public
pressure reacting to the violence and terrorism of the intifada
propelled the Israeli government to set up a "seam" zone and security
fence, including around Jerusalem. The route approved by the government
in June 2002 and in October 2003 intended to expand Jerusalem's
boundaries with an additional security region. All the hilltops
commanding Jerusalem and located outside its boundaries have been
included in the seam region: Mount Gilo in the south, which also
overlooks Bethlehem and Beit Jalah, and Nebi Samuel and the Sheikh
Zeitun range in the north, which also dominate Betunia and Ramallah.
The Israeli government decided to include the geographical area annexed
in 1967 and additional territories in the seam zone, but did not fully
integrate the populated areas or provide infrastructures and services
comparable to Israeli areas.19 The fence under construction effects a
substantive change in the ways of life of the Palestinian population in
the eastern part of the city and the Jerusalem metropolitan area. The
200,000 Palestinians who will live between the fence and the Green Line
will be obliged to develop new routines, as will those who will live on
the eastern side of the fence, but this will not obviate the
Palestinian demand that East Jerusalem be the capital of the future
state. The ruling of the Supreme Court in June 2004 in the petition
submitted by residents of the Palestinian village of Beit Surich,
joined by residents of Mevasseret Zion and the Council for Peace and
Security, forced the Israeli government in February 2005 to approve an
alternative route for the fence that balances Israeli security with
Palestinian lifestyle needs. This new route will reduce slightly the
amount of Palestinian land separated from its owners and the number of
Palestinians on the western side of the fence, but it does not
substantively mitigate the separation of East Jerusalem from the
Palestinian population of the West Bank.
Despite its ostensible unification, therefore, the city functions
essentially as two separate capitals, of Israel and of the Palestinians
in the West Bank.20 All five principles that led to delineating the
boundaries of the city in 1967 are no longer relevant, either because
of the failure of their aims, such as the detachment of East Jerusalem
from the West Bank, or because of the political developments that
obviate the need for defense against a regular army.21 Even with any
changes to the demarcation of the security fence, the fabric of life of
the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and the West Bank will be
seriously harmed after the completion of the fence. Additional measures
by the Jerusalem municipality, such as the intention to construct
Jewish neighborhoods in the heart of the Palestinian population, are
liable to complicate the feasibility of separation on a demographic
basis that currently still exists in Jerusalem.22
If so, and on the understanding that the annexation and the
construction of the new Jewish neighborhoods did not succeed in
dissuading the Palestinians from striving to establish their capital in
the eastern part of the city, there must be a different approach to the
challenge of Jerusalem. First, an interim period is necessary to effect
the transition from a "unified" city into the two capitals of two
states. In the second stage, the holy sites must be organized anew in
order to fuse the religious and political interests in a permanent
solution for Jerusalem. The validity of the solution in the second
stage will rest on its acceptance by both sides as part of a permanent
settlement, and it will be realized only as part a comprehensive
permanent solution, in order to prevent the stronger side from imposing
any dominance it enjoyed in the interim agreement.
THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION
At the core of interim period proposal is a narrower seam zone. Map 4 and table 1 depict this proposal, which ensures the security needs of the Jewish neighborhoods in the eastern and western parts of the city and preserves the fabric of life of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem and the greater metropolitan area. Significantly, the proposal does not call for changing the legal status of the city and its residents and does not affect the social services they are entitled to. The following principles underlie the proposal for a more limited seam zone:
Ongoing IDF, General Security Services (GSS), and Israeli police
operations on both sides of the security barrier, until an agreement is
reached between the sides.
Security of the Israeli neighborhoods in Jerusalem in a protected
region separate from the Palestinian neighborhoods.23 The form of
separation will be based on a different profile than the existing one.
It will be possible to incorporate a decorative electronic fence or
maintain a separation based on the existing topographical route.
Contiguity between Jerusalem and the large Israeli residential areas in
the metropolitan area (Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev) and their
inclusion in the protected region.
Creation of a system of crossings that will permit entrance by Israeli
residents – Israelis and Palestinians – into the Israeli protected
region (exit from it will not be controlled).
Retention of most of the existing barrier with seven crossings that
will be "routinely open" for Palestinian needs and Israeli traffic
bypassing Jerusalem, while maintaining security through random checks
or absolute control, subject to the current security assessment. This
barrier will create a region for preliminary monitoring of terrorist
activities before they reach the protected region.
Maintaining access by both populations to the sites holy to the three
religions.
For example, a Palestinian bearing a Palestinian Authority identity
card may leave the bloc of villages to the south of Highway 443 (on the
Modi'in – Givat Ze'ev road), drive on the road, enter the monitoring
region near Beit Horon at a point that is "routinely open," cross, and
leave for Betunia in the region of the Ofer refugee camp at a similar
point. Alternatively, he may reach the Palestinian neighborhoods in
northern Jerusalem, Shuafat and Beit Hanina, and cross to the east and
the south under a bridge in the region of the Shuafat refugee camp
without being delayed. The entry to the monitoring region will be
controlled and modified by Israeli security forces based on security
evaluations. If he is also authorized to enter Jerusalem he may use one
of the three following crossings: Bidu in the north, "Checkpoint 300"
near Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem in the south, and Mount Scopus in the
east. An Israeli who does not wish to enter Jerusalem may use the same
route and continue to the Jordan Valley or the Dead Sea without delay.
Entry to the city itself will be through the checkpoints for Israelis.
On the assumption that the Israeli government and the PLO can end the
conflict only through resuming negotiations on a permanent settlement,
this proposal enjoys the following advantages:
The security for Jerusalem's Jewish neighborhoods is improved, because
they are included in a protected region without a Palestinian
population that participates in the Palestinian struggle.
The legal status of the city and of its residents is not harmed and the
Palestinian residents will continue to enjoy municipal services, social
security payments, and other institutional services. However, if the
Israeli government coordinates with the Palestinian Authority, it will
be possible to transfer the neighborhoods in whole or part to
Palestinian responsibility with the status of Area B.
The Israeli and Palestinian routines in the Jerusalem region and in the
city itself will be preserved in their present alignment – the western
part of the city and the Jewish neighborhoods with the State of Israel,
and the Palestinian neighborhoods with the West Bank. This will halt
the increasing tendency of the emigration of Palestinian holders of
Israeli identity cards into Israel,24 as well as the decrease in the
standard of living in East Jerusalem, an economic reality that provides
fertile ground for terrorist organizations to recruit new operatives.
In physical terms, the proposal can be feasibly implemented and does
not delay the completion of the fence approved by the government.
The proposal permits postponing the specific political argument regarding the boundaries of Jerusalem because it preserves the municipal status quo, although some people will claim the exact opposite, since the boundaries of the protected region are determined on a demographic basis.
The proposal provides a political channel for the solution of the conflict without obstructing implementation of an agreement based on the Clinton proposal.
The proposal includes a saving of hundreds of millions of shekels in
the construction of crossings in the security fence required for
preserving the Palestinian fabric of life.
There are those who oppose the very foundation on which this proposal
is based – partition of Jerusalem in accordance with Clinton's
proposal. In addition, the proposal includes certain shortcomings:
Opposition from the Israeli Right for the demarcation of a political route based on a demographic line that excludes the City of David and the Mount of Olives from the Israeli area.
Opposition from the Palestinian residents of the city for the control
of their passage between the eastern and western parts of the city.25
Palestinian criticism on Israel's capacity to close the monitoring region to the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria.
Increase in construction and operating costs of the barrier, which will essentially depend on two systems (notwithstanding the savings specified above).
Reduction of the time and space for terrorist penetration from Judea
and Samaria into the western part of the city, because of the
"routinely open" concept of the entrances to the monitoring region
partially bordering on the protected region.
Overall, however, it appears that this proposal is not only viable, but
will lay the groundwork on both sides in terms of routine and public
opinion for a redefinition of "unified" Jerusalem as two capitals for
two independent states.
THE PERMANENT SOLUTION: PROPOSAL FOR THE HISTORICAL AREA
A permanent solution on Jerusalem will necessarily include a settlement for the area of historical significance, which includes and extends beyond the Old City boundaries. Map 5 depicts the region containing the holy sites, consisting primarily of religious institutions and cemeteries. Some of this region is physically bounded by the Ottoman walls built at the beginning of the sixteenth century, which in themselves do not have any kind of sanctity that requires factoring them in as an exclusive criterion.
Construction of new walls around the designated region, without harming
the existing walls, 26 will lead to a physical distinction between the
holy places and the rest of the city. The walls will be constructed as
a joint project among Israelis and Palestinians. Their underlying
concept will be to designate a region for joint use rather than
announcing a divisive boundary, although with a capacity for separation
from the greater urban area based on existing architectural
solutions.27 It is possible that within the walls will be included
sites for transportation, culture, commerce, entertainment, museums,
exhibits, and so on, important for members of the three religions
living in the city. This physical separation will permit implementation
of the model of an "open city," proposed in the Geneva accord for the
Old City only, for the entire region. Although sovereignty over the
region will be formally divided between the parties in accordance with
the Clinton proposal, there will be no physical obstacles, and in
practice the status quo will be preserved in all sites sacred to the
three religions.
Application of the model of the open city to the proposed area in
addition to the Old City is fair to both sides. Israel will implement
the special regime on Mount Zion and the Palestinians on the City of
David and the sites in the Kidron Valley. No change will occur to the
special status of the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives and
David's Citadel, which will remain under Israeli administration. All
the special arrangements required in order to ensure freedom of
religious worship in sites outside the Ottoman walls will be preserved.
A Jewish Israeli wishing to visit an area under Palestinian sovereignty
will enter through one of the four gates under Israeli sovereignty, and
can visit the City of David, for example, without a passport or any
organized ferrying shuttle, and will return in the same way. The same
applies to a Palestinian Christian who wishes to visit a church on
Mount Zion or a Muslim Palestinian wishing to visit a Muslim cemetery
there. A resident of Silwan in the City of David will not be required
to go around the Old City in order to enter the market in the Muslim
Quarter via the Lion's Gate, but may do so easily via the new southern
gate leading to the Dung Gate. All the details related to traffic,
residency, municipal services, and security will be a function of joint
jurisdiction.28 The private purchasing procedures will be identical in
the matter for the entire territory of the Palestinian state and the
State of Israel. It is possible, subject to the agreement of both
sides, that the coordination between the two municipalities regarding
joint management of the region will include the option of the
continuation of residence by Jews in areas under Palestinian
sovereignty, such as the City of David. The remaining municipal area of
unified Jerusalem will be divided on the basis of the Clinton proposal,
while establishing the border arrangements at the crossings to be
constructed, based on the existing and planned system of roads.
CONCLUSION
The proposal provides practical and fair resolutions to the religious and nationalist tensions between Israel and the Palestinians that harbor particular intensity regarding Jerusalem. The details of the proposal are based on a win-win concept and not on a zero sum game. The solution does not blur the division of sovereignty and thus prevents incentives for violation of the agreement by attempts to impose any fait accompli.
Adoption of this proposal will permit overcoming one of the major
obstacles to a permanent settlement between the sides. Once peace will
be reached between the sides, it will be possible to extend the model
to additional areas in Jerusalem or to other places, without
constructing a physical barrier.
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1 As listed by Ruth Lapidot, Moshe Hirsch, and Devorah Hausen in their
book Jerusalem – Where To? (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies,
1999).
2 See A Review of Positions in Peace Settlements for Jerusalem (Teddy
Kollek Center for Jerusalem Research, Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, 2000).
3 Although since May 2000 more Israelis have agreed to partition, and
the dispute is about the extent of the division.
4 The Jordanians violated their commitment regarding freedom of access
to the holy sites and desecrated the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of
Olives.
5 The founders of political Zionism were aware of the sensitivity of
the holy places in Jerusalem. Herzl supported internationalization of
the holy places, and Weizmann opposed including the Old City of
Jerusalem in the Jewish state.
6 Jerusalem: Legal Aspects, (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies,
1999).
7 UN Security Council Resolution 242, November 1967, demands Israeli
withdrawal to the 1967 borders, which include the western part of the
city only.
8 According to the law "Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel, 1980," which
repeated the law for amendment of the order for arrangements of rule
and law (No. 11), 5727-1967.
9 Just as it did not recognize the Jordanian annexation in 1950.
10 Anna Hazzan, The Boundaries of Jurisdiction of Jerusalem 1948-1993
(Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1995).
11 Ibid.
12 They are all currently included or planned within the region of the
security fence.
13 Meron Rappoport, Ha'aretz, January 22, 2005. Execution of this
decision has been suspended by the attorney-general.
14 As described by a study group on Jerusalem, Peace Settlements for
Jerusalem (Teddy Kollek Center for Jerusalem Research, Jerusalem
Institute for Israel Studies, 2000).
15 Virtually no Arabs from East Jerusalem are accepted for work in
hi-tech, and employment is limited primarily to textile, metal,
footwear, and stone industries.
16 As voiced, for example, in speeches by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg at
the UN General Assembly (1967), and by Ambassador Charles Yost at the
Security Council (1969).
17 See Gilad Sher, Just Beyond Reach: The Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Negotiations 1999-2002, ed. Rami Tal (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2001),
and Shlomo Ben Ami, A Front without a Rearguard: A Voyage to the
Boundaries of the Peace Process, ed. Rami Tal (Tel Aviv: Yediot
Ahronot, 2004).
18As Clinton acknowledged in December 2003 in a meeting with those who
initiated the Geneva understandings.
19Ya'akov Garv, The Separation Fence and the Jewish Neighborhoods in
Jerusalem (Florsheimer Institute for Policy Research, November 2004).
20 A noteworthy statistic, published by the Jerusalem Institute, in
Alternatives for the Route of the Security Fence in Jerusalem, December
2004, indicates that the number of daily crossings of the municipal
boundary was thirteen times as great as the number of crossings of the
demographic boundary.
21 For an additional analysis see Moshe Amirav, "If we don't partition
Jerusalem, we shall lose it," Ofakim Hadashim no. 17 (January 2005).
22 The Kidmat Zion neighborhood in Abu Dis, the Nof Zion neighborhood
in Jabel Mukabar, the neighborhood in Wadi Joz, and others.
23 Based on the proposal of the Council for Peace and Security.
24 For example, from A-Ram only, which has a population of 63,000,
5,000 have already moved to Israel in the last two years.
25 Although in practice, partial control is already taking place today
by means of portable roadblocks set up by the police and the IDF.
26 These belong, as part of the Old City, to the list of the world
cultural assets compiled by UNESCO.
27 Yehuda Greenfeld, Keren Li-Bracha, Aya Shapira, Terminal on Border,
Final project in the faculty for architecture and town planning,
Technion, Haifa, 2004.
28 As outlined in article 6 of the Geneva accord.