Rabbi Moshe Reiss
The Israeli
- Palestinian conflict: Part E
HAMAS:
‘Honey Traps’:
Many months the Asia Times posted a
column of mine entitles “The
Breakup of Iraq:
A Country No More”; given today’s news it is worth rereading. “http://www.moshereiss.org/columns/19_iraq.htm”
“What happens to a dream deferred? Does
it dry up like a raison in the sun? Or does it explode? (Langston
Hughes, Black
American Poet, 1902-1967)
“The United
States and Israel are discussing ways
to
destabilize the Palestinian government so that newly elected Hamas
officials
will fail and elections will be called again, according to Israeli
officials
and Western diplomats.” (NYT, Feb. 14)
Was Hamas a
poor choice for Palestinians?
Only if you believe the election was
about the Peace process. However to Palestinians Hamas
appeared as a normal, viable, and
reasonable choice with a good stand on internal violence and a clear
anti-corruption agenda.
Can a
significant (almost a majority) of the Palestinian society be ignored?
Khalid Abu Toameh, a Palestinian
journalist, recently described American policy toward the Palestinian
elections: "If you don't vote for the same thieves who have been
stealing
your money for ten years, we are going to punish you." (JINSA Feb. 18)
Does this mean America,
the
West and Israel
have to observe the Arab street - Arab public opinion?
Can those who are already driven to
rioting by fury and frustration (note the Cartoon rioting; http://moshereiss.org/columns/22_cartoons.htm’)
be helped by increased poverty? Is it
really possible to expect that more punishment from the Israelis and
the
Americans, this time for not voting the way we wanted them to, would
lead them
to abandon Hamas?
Will that not guarantee the prospects
of Hamas’ terrorist wing as against its social welfare wing? Is
confrontation
better than integration?
Mahmoud Abbas who in one year as
President has failed is now the Savior of the West who will preserve Palestine
society. He
continued from Arafat a corrupt, inefficient and ineffective
government. The
man who failed to consolidate the twelve security forces (formerly in
charge of
three) will now be in charge of them all. Abbas succeeded in two ways;
he ran a
free and fair election which his opponents won and he arranged a
relatively
successful truce.
Can we from
the West really understand Hamas:
Two well known and respected authors
both from the Washington Institute for Near East policy have different
perspectives.
David Makovsky writes in a new book
‘Engagement
through Disengagement’ that “felicitous change in Palestinian
leadership at a
time of bold new Israeli policies has thrown open the proverbial window
of
opportunity. The coming year promises renewed prospects for movement
toward
peace, and the United
States,
more than any other third party, has a vital diplomatic role to play
during
this crucial period. How can Washington
take
advantage of the momentum created by the imminent Israeli withdrawal
from the Gaza
Strip?”
Matthew
Leavitt writes in a new book ‘Hamas:
Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad’ that “real
Hamas: an
organization that threatens peace and security far beyond the borders
of the
West Bank and Gaza.
Its military, political, and social “wings” are distinct from one
another is
belied by ample evidence. In fact, the records show, Hamas meets in the
mosques
and hospitals it maintains to plan terror attacks, buries caches of
arms and
explosives under its own schoolyard playgrounds, and transfers and
launders funds
for terrorist activity through local charity committees. This book
catalogues
the alarming extent to which Hamas’ political and social welfare
leaders
support terror.
Part of this problem is the difference
between External Hamas leaders Khaled Mashal and Mousa Abu Marzouk
living in
Damascus versus internal leaders and recently elected leaders of the
new PLC
Ismail Haniyyeh (prospective Prime Minister) and Mahmoud Zahar likely
to be a
high ranking Minister. The former may be interested in violence, but
the latter
living in Palestine
and running on a platform of ‘Reform and Change’ need a non-violent
calm to
accomplish their objectives.
The New
P.A. Government:
In his opening speech to parliament,
Abbas established his basic policies for a Hamas government; to
recognize prior
agreements with Israel
and abandon violence. He did not state that he expected Hamas to
recognize Israel.
What will be the platform of Prime
Minister designate Ismail Haniyeh? He has previously stated, "We will
go
for arms and a parliament, for there's no contradiction between the
two."
Haniyah immediately responded to Abbas
pronouncements: “There were many points of disagreement, [Abbas] was
elected
according to his program, and we were elected according to a different
program."
Not much will probably happen until the
end of March when Israel
has its own election. Assuming suicide bombers do not occur before the
election
the centrist party Kadima will win. Hamas will not choose suicide
bombing but
Islamic Jihad have declared war not only on Israel but also on Hamas
and they
may. Will Kadima continue it stated policy of not talking to Hamas. I
hope
not. Hamas’ win can work in Israel's favor if Israel and Western leaders
intelligently calibrate their responses to the Hamas-led Palestinian
Authority.
The Israeli government can ‘talk’ to Hamas without negotiating a peace
treaty
which neither party has an interest in anyway. (See my column Does
Anyone Want
A Peace Treaty?
‘http://moshereiss.org/special/17_peace.htm”)
It appears that Hamas may offer Israel the following: to uphold the
agreements
already negotiated with Israel
and the willingness to enter into a long-term ceasefire (hudna) if Israel withdraws to the line of 4 June
1967, but
they will never recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel.
This can be considered a
‘Honey Trap’ for Israel.
Israel’s reaction appears to be a No to
any talks to Hamas, similar to its previous No to Fatah unless they
destroyed
the infrastructure of Jihadists including Hamas. There was no Peace
Partner and
the new government means there still is not! Furthermore the Israeli
government
with the apparent approval of American and Europe
will stop funding the P.A.
The Palestinians are the most
subsidized and dependent people in the world. The PA budget is $190
million a
month; these are currently funded by $40M in tax revenue, $40M from Israel from custom taxes (based on the Paris Protocol) and the remainder primarily from
Europe
and America.
If Israel
and the funding sources dry up can the PA survive? The IMF has
recommended $20M
reduction of spending and increases in tax collection. (This did not
include
reducing corruption by any significant amount.) Saudi and the Gulf states
have committed $33M after Hamas’
victory, leaving a budget deficit of almost $57M. Israel has stated that it
will
declines to pay the taxes they collect for the Palestinians as of
February,
thus increasing the deficit becomes $97. (Washington Institute for Near
East Policy,
Focus #53, February 18). In addition Israel (with some International
help)
could attempt to have a boycott of Palestine implemented – after all
international boycotts have been implemented towards South Africa and
Iraq in
previous years and some have even boycotted Israel.
What are
the likely results of this No reaction to the Hamas ‘Honey Trap’?
How are the approximately 1.4 million
people
of Gaza Strip (49% under 14 years of
age) and
the West Bank approximate population
of 2
million (44% under 14 years of age) going
to survive? How will this young generation (too young even to vote)
react to
economic collapse and a humanitarian disaster? The health and education
sectors
in Palestine
happen to be almost completely governmental services. Ninety-nine
percent of
all educational services are governmental. More than 95 percent of the
primary
health care sector and more than 80 percent of secondary and tertiary
healthcare is governmental.
Is
economic collapse likely to increase or decrease
the level of terrorist attacks and Israeli counter measures? Or is
likely to be
counterproductive?
In the long, history of the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute, there is not a shred of evidence to
support the
notion that pushing the Palestinian population into more economic
desperation
would somehow cause them to moderate their political views.
Many Israeli analysts have their
doubts. A crackdown could backfire and cause Palestinians to close
ranks. They
warn of the unintended consequences when American or Israeli money
stops
arriving. A deepening chaos in the West Bank and Gaza as economic conditions
deteriorate is
likely. That could spur a return to terrorism, which has been at a low
ebb
since Hamas approved a cease-fire a year ago.
“Israel’s refusal to open channels of
communication actually frees the [Hamas] movement from any need to show
the
sort of flexibility on basic ideological and strategic principles that
would
blur the distinction between itself and other factors in Palestinian
politics,
especially Fatah” (Anat Kurz, Tel Aviv University Notes, 161, February
20).
This would further complicate Hamas’ efforts to consolidate its control
over
Gaza and the West Bank and fail in its ‘Reform and Change’ platform. Is
that
actually to Israel’s
interest?
Another alternative is for Iran
to pay that difference. The $97M amounts to approximately $1 a barrel
of oil
they sell, perhaps four percent of the oil price increase in the last
several
years. Could Iran accomplish if they
choose?
Certainly! Does anyone think it is advisable to allow President
Ahmadinejad,
the obsessive anti-Semite, to fund Hamas as it already funds Hizbollah
for $10
million per month? Without stated an amount Ahmadinejad has stated he
will
support Hamas.
Could Israel
instead of simply saying No create a counter ‘Honey Trap’?
What would such a counter ‘Honey Trap’
look like? The following is intended as an example.
- To allow continued humanitarian funding of
the P.A. through Non-Governmental Agencies (N.G.O.’s) as determined by
John Wolfensohn, current Middle East
Quartet envoy and former World Bank president (but not to exceed
previous amounts).
- To have Lieutenant General Ward, former U.S.
advisor and security coordinator for the P.A. who evaluated security
consolidation establish a security budget for a consolidated P.A.
security services.
- To have Salam Fayyad, a member of the
Palestinian Legislative Council and former P.A. Finance Minister (and
employee of the World Bank) reappointed as Finance Minister and control
money going directly to the P.A.
All these would be subject to a (say)
two month long period of no rockets being fired unto Israel.
The consolidation of
security consolidation would take place within the same two months;
thereafter
the government of the P.A. would be responsible for stopping any
suicide
bombing.
In exchange for this Israel would agree to a
long term
cease fire and agree to support American and European funding. It is
worth
noting that Hamas accepted a ceasefire for almost an entire year (since
March
2005) without a withdrawal to the 1967 borders. The cease fire would be
voided
if any rocket fly toward Israel
or a suicide bomber comes into Israel
after the two month period.
Would this force Hamas to either accept
or counter Israel’s
proposal to achieve its own platform objectives? Would this be more
favorable
to Israel
than economic chaos and increased terrorism? Would this not confront
Hamas with
the problems of fulfilling its own platform without having the excuse
of Israel, America
and European refusal to
fund?
Many commentators have stated Hamas did
not want or expect to win but rather be the loyal opposition. That
arrangement
had undeniable appeal. Hamas would not have to be involved in
participating in a
government, let alone control it. They would not have to directly deal
with Israel,
recognize and abide by past agreements, and meet the conditions for
receiving
continued outside aid. They would have been spared the internal
tensions between
the more radical and more pragmatic wings of the Islamist movement. In
might
have been able to preserve its ideological purity while gaining the
freedom to
carry out its program.
As George F. Will, an American
Conservative spokesman has stated about
that ideological group having come out of the wilderness; “Having honed
strong,
clear convictions about government before experiencing the inevitable
compromises involved in actually governing, many conservatives have
found
governance discomfiting.”
Hamas has stated its desire to create a
national unity government which would help President Abbas in his
moderate
positions. Abbas's gambled that integrating Hamas into Palestinian
politics
would moderate its behavior. As part of that understanding Hamas has
demonstrated its willingness and ability to honor a cease fire for
almost a
year. As part of this local Hamas officials have maintained practical
coordination with Israel
when necessary.
Could this
allow Hamas to negotiate the Israeli ‘honey trap’?
On Sunday February 25 Lally Weymouth of the Washington
Post published an interview with the designated Prime Minister Ismail
Haniyeh.
He stated as follows:
“If Israel
withdraws to the '67 borders, then we will establish a peace in
stages.”
Weymouth - “Do you
recognize Israel's
right to exist?”
“The
answer is to let Israel
say it will recognize a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders,
release the
prisoners and recognize the rights of the refugees to return to Israel.
Hamas will have a position if this occurs.”
Weymouth - “Will
you recognize Israel?”
“If Israel
declares that it will give the Palestinian people a state and give them
back all
their rights, then we are ready to recognize them. . .
Our only position will be declared once Israel
recognizes our right to exist.”
Should
this not be a mutual recognition? Why should Israel
recognize the Palestinian right to a state if the Palestinian quasi
government
refuses to recognize the Israeli state?
Shibley Telhami (Saban Center
for Middle Eastern Policy – Brookings Institution) stated the result of
Islamic
parties winning elections requires the West to involve in “partial
engagement,
patience, and a willingness to allow such new governments space and
time to put
their goals to the test of reality. Hamas, in fact, could provide a
place for
testing whether careful engagement leads to moderation. If we are not
willing
to engage, there is only one alternative: to rethink the policy of
accelerated
electoral democracy and focus on a more incremental approach of
institutional
and economic reform of existing governments. There is no realistic
third party
that's likely to emerge anytime soon.” (Washington
Post, February 17)
(The term ‘Honey Traps’ in this context
was first mentioned briefly by Anat Kurz in the Tel Aviv University
Notes, 161,
February 20, but did not define or flesh it out.)